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Abstract
This paper studies the interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary policy in a DSGE model with
sticky prices and non-zero trend inﬂation. We characterize the ﬁscal and monetary policies by a
rule whereby a given fraction k of the government debt must be backed by the discounted value of
current and future primary surpluses. The remaining fraction of debt is backed by seigniorage
revenues. When k =1, there is no ﬁscal dominance, since the ﬁscal authority backs all debt and
accommodates (independent) monetary policy, by adjusting current or future primary surpluses to
satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. If k = 0, all debt is backed by the
monetary authority and there is complete ﬁscal dominance. A continuum of possibilities lies
between these two polar cases. We numerically show that: 1) the degree of ﬁscal dominance, as
measured by (1 – k), is positively related to trend inﬂation, and 2) when prices are sticky, k has
signiﬁcant effects on the business cycle dynamics. The model is estimated using Bayesian
techniques. Estimates of k imply a high degree of ﬁscal dominance in both Mexico and South
Korea, but almost no ﬁscal dominance in Canada and the U.S. The country-speciﬁc estimates of
the structural parameters are used in a second-order approximation of the equilibrium around the
deterministic steady-state to evaluate the welfare costs of ﬁscal dominance. Results suggest
signiﬁcant welfare losses for countries with high degrees of ﬁscal dominance.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31, E42, E50, E63
Bank classification: Economic models; Fiscal policy; Inflation: costs and benefits; Monetary
policy framework
Résumé
Les auteurs étudient l’interdépendance des politiques budgétaire et monétaire au moyen d’un
modèle d’équilibre général dynamique et stochastique à prix rigides et taux d’inﬂation tendanciel
non nul. Les politiques en question sont caractérisées par une règle selon laquelle une fraction k
de la dette publique doit être garantie par la valeur actualisée des excédents primaires présents et
futurs, et la fraction restante par les revenus de seigneuriage. Il n’y a aucune prépondérance
budgétaire lorsque k =1, car les autorités budgétaires garantissent l’ensemble de la dette et
s’adaptent à la politique monétaire (indépendante) en modiﬁant les excédents primaires présents
ou futurs, de façon à tenir compte de la contrainte budgétaire intertemporelle de l’État. Lorsque
k = 0, l’ensemble de la dette se trouve nantie par les autorités monétaires et la prépondérance
budgétaire est totale. Entre ces deux cas de ﬁgure il existe un continuum de possibilités. Les
calculs des auteurs montrent, d’une part, que le degré de prépondérance budgétaire, donné par
(1 – k), est corrélé positivement avec le taux d’inﬂation tendanciel et, d’autre part, que k a desiv
effets sensibles sur la dynamique du cycle économique dans un contexte de rigidité des prix. Le
modèle est estimé à l’aide de techniques bayésiennes. Les résultats des estimations de k
impliquent l’existence d’un degré élevé de prépondérance budgétaire au Mexique comme en
Corée du Sud, mais sa quasi-absence au Canada et aux États-Unis. À partir des estimations des
paramètres structurels obtenues pour chaque pays, les auteurs effectuent une approximation du
second ordre autour des valeurs d’équilibre de l’état stationnaire déterministe aﬁn de mesurer les
coûts de la prépondérance budgétaire sur le plan du bien-être. Au vu des résultats, les pays à forte
prépondérance budgétaire connaîtraient d’importantes pertes dans ce domaine.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E31, E42, E50, E63
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Politique budgétaire; Inﬂation : coûts et
avantages; Cadre de la politique monétaire2
1 Introduction
This paper studies the e®ect of di®erent degrees of interdependence between ¯scal and monetary
policy on the equilibrium path of a monetary economy. From a policy perspective, the subject
is relevant because distinct equilibrium outcomes resulting from di®erences in ¯scal/monetary ar-
rangements may map into the central bank's ability to ¯ght in°ation (Sargent and Wallace 1981,
Aiyagari and Gertler 1985, Leeper 1991, Kumhof et al. 2007). Empirical studies of the reduced ef-
fectiveness of anti-in°ationary monetary policy in the presence of ¯scal dominance ¡ that is, when
monetary policy is subordinated to ¯scal needs ¡ include Tanner and Ramos (2002), Blanchard
(2004), and Favero and Giavazzi (2004).
We revisit the subject of ¯scal/monetary policy interdependence in the context of an estimated
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of a monetary economy with sticky prices.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper to do so. Previous studies either lack empirical
tests for theoretical models of the interdependence between ¯scal and monetary policies (Aiyagari
and Gertler 1985), estimate reduced-form restrictions from non-microfounded models (Taner and
Ramos 2002, Blanchard 2004, and Favero and Giavazzi 2004), or estimate a single equation resulting
from dynamic general equilibrium models (Castro, Resende and Ruge-Murcia 2003, and Resende
2007). This paper advances the existing literature by estimating of a fully speci¯ed structural
model.
Except for the government's policy rule, we use a standard model with Calvo-type price setting,
in the tradition of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004),
with non-zero trend in°ation (Ascari 2004; Amano, Ambler, and Rebei 2006). Instead of well-
known Taylor-type rules or money-growth rules as reaction functions for the central bank, the
policy rule used in this paper is designed to characterize the interaction between the monetary and
¯scal authorities. We draw on earlier research by Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), Castro, Resende
and Ruge-Murcia (2003), and Resende (2007) in de¯ning a long-run ¯scal/monetary policy rule
whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, · 2 [0;1], is backed by the present discounted
value of current and future primary surpluses, while the remaining debt is backed by seigniorage
revenue.
To understand how the parameter · summarizes the degree of interdependence between ¯scal
and monetary authorities, ¯rst note that there is a continuum of policy regimes indexed by ·, with
two polar cases. When · = 1, the ¯scal authority fully backs the government debt and there is
¯scal accommodation to monetary policy in the following sense: any increase in debt held by the
private sector (for example, when the central bank sells government bonds in the open market) must
be followed by higher current or future levels of the primary surplus. While the ¯scal authority
raises primary surpluses to back the principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt, the1 Introduction 3
monetary authority does not respond. We refer to this case as one of zero ¯scal dominance or
complete central bank independence.
In the opposite extreme, where · = 0, the monetary authority completely backs the government
debt. Whenever, say, a budget de¯cit is ¯nanced with new debt, the monetary authority fully
accommodates the ¯scal authority's action by increasing current and/or future seigniorage revenues
in order to back the principal and interest payments on the additional debt. The ¯scal authority is
insensitive to monetary policy in that neither taxes nor expenditures react, today or in the future,
to changes in the stock of outstanding debt. We de¯ne this case as one of complete ¯scal dominance.
We view the long-run ¯scal rule indexed by · as an unrestrictive parameterization of government
behavior that is convenient both analytically and empirically. It captures in a reduced-form way the
idea that in response to di®erent institutional settings, the monetary authority will face di®erent
obligations regarding ¯scal policy. An advantage of this approach, especially for comparisons across
di®ernt economies, is that we are able to solve the model and obtain empirical estimates of · using
the long-run policy rule without having to assume particular \period-by-period" policy rules ¡
presumably, country speci¯c and/or time-vaying ¡ such as Taylor-type rules (Taylor 1993; Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler 2000), money growth rules (Dib 2003), or ¯scal policy reaction functions (Leeper
1991; Kumhof et al. 2007).1
In this paper, we ¯rst study the dynamic and long run implications of an independent central
bank vis-µ a-vis the case where there is ¯scal dominance. We numerically show that trend in°ation
is positively related to the degree of ¯scal dominance, represented by (1 ¡ ·). With sticky prices,
this implies a mapping between · and the coe±cient of real marginal costs in the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC) with important implications for the short-run equilibrium dynamics. Also,
using impulse response functions to di®erent types of shocks, we show that · is crucial for business
cycle dynamics in terms of the ampli¯cation and direction of aggregate °uctuations.
Next, using data on the monetary base, government debt, output, and in°ation, and applying
Bayesian techniques, we estimate the model for Canada, Mexico, South Korea, and the United
States. The estimates of · imply a high degree of ¯scal dominance in both Mexico and South
Korea, but almost no ¯scal dominance in Canada and the U.S. The country-speci¯c estimates
of the structural parameters are then used in a second-order approximation of the equilibrium
around the deterministic steady-state to evaluate the welfare costs of ¯scal dominance according
to a consumption-equivalence measure. Results from the welfare analysis suggest that: 1) there
are signi¯cant welfare losses for countries with high degrees of ¯scal dominance, and 2) there is
a trade-o® between distortions coming from regular taxation (income and consumption) vis-µ a-vis
in°ationary revenues, implying that zero ¯scal dominance is not necessarily optimal.
1Leeper (1991) uses a tax rule whereby tax revenues respond to government liabilities. Kumhof et al (2007) also
consider responses to government spending.4
These results have important implications for monetary policy. First, to the extent that ·
captures institutional aspects of the interaction between the monetary and ¯scal authorities, they
con¯rm the idea that institutional arrangements based on more independent central banks, together
with ¯scal policies that actively respond to government liabilities, tend to be welfare improving
(Kumhof et al. 2007). Second, di®erently from the so-called Friedman's Rule (Friedman 1969), the
results imply a non-negative optimal rate of in°ation, since some in°ation may be needed to reduce
distortions coming from taxation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some related literature. Section
3 describes the model and outlines the e®ect of ¯scal dominance on long run (average or trend)
in°ation. Section 4 presents the results of Bayesian estimation of the model for Canada, Mexico,
South Korea, and the United States. Based on a parametrization of the model for the United
States, we provide a discussion of the e®ect of ¯scal dominance on the model's dynamic properties.
Section 5 relies on the country-speci¯c estimated parameters to measure the welfare gain associated
with a (counterfactual) reduction of the degree of ¯scal dominance to zero. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Sargent and Wallace (1981) were among the ¯rst to point out the potential di±culties of conducting
monetary policy in an environment where ¯scal policy dominates the coordination game played
between monetary and ¯scal authorities. When the central bank is independent from the ¯scal
authority, it determines how much seigniorage revenue can be raised by setting its policy in advance.
This ¯rst mover central bank should impose discipline on the ¯scal authority, forcing it to select a
sequence of primary surpluses (and debt) that is consistent with the sequence of money supplied by
the monetary authority in terms of satisfying the government's consolidated intertemporal budget
constraint. In this case, Sargent and Wallace's analysis suggests that ¯scal variables do not matter
for price determination and, as a consequence, central banks committed to price stability can indeed
deliver price stability regardless of ¯scal policy.
Alternatively, in a regime of ¯scal dominance, the ¯scal authority moves ¯rst and de¯nes the
path of the primary surplus.2 Any necessary adjustments to avoid explosive debt paths must come
in the form of seigniorage revenues. Given the predetermined path for the primary surplus, \tight"
monetary policy can potentially result in higher, rather than lower, in°ation. Standard monetary
policy responses to in°ationary shocks will have perverse e®ects: monetary tightening today triggers
higher interest rates, increases interest payments on the government's debt, and requires \loose"
2Sargent (1982) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) refer to this case as the Non-Ricardian ¯scal regime, as opposed
to the Ricardian regime, where there is monetary dominance and the monetary authority moves ¯rst. Leeper (1991)
calls it an active ¯scal/passive monetary policy regime.2 Related Literature 5
money in the future to generate additional seigniorage revenue. Rational agents anticipate the
future increase in money creation and bid the price level up today. This is Sargent and Wallace's
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.
The idea that di®erent combinations of potentially interdependent policy rules, implemented by
¯scal and monetary authorities, may deliver distinct equilibrium paths for nominal variables and
a®ect the ability of monetary policy to control in°ation was also put forward by Aiyagari and Gertler
(1985) and Leeper (1991). Both studies theoretically show that the presence of \passive" central
banks following monetary policies that are accommodative to the ¯scal authority's behaviour leads
to higher average in°ation.
The empirical relevance of ¯scal dominance has been examined in several papers. For instance,
Bohn (1998) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) investigate the sustainability of ¯scal policy
in the United States, by exploiting the idea that under a regime characterized by ¯scal dominance,
primary de¯cits are set independently of real liabilities (while the central bank is forced to in°ate
away the debt to keep the government's intertemporal budget constraint satis¯ed). More specif-
ically, Bohn's (1998) backward-looking approach tests if the government cuts its primary de¯cit
when liabilities rise (as implied by the absence of ¯scal dominance), while the forward-looking
approach used by Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) tests if current reductions in the primary
de¯cit help pay down the debt, reducing either future liabilities or future interest rate payments
(again, as implied by no ¯scal dominance). Results from both tests provide little evidence of ¯scal
dominance in the United States. However, Tanner and Ramos (2005) apply these two approaches
to Brazil during the 1991-2000 period, and ¯nd strong support for the presence of ¯scal dominance.
Possible unintended consequences of monetary policy under ¯scal dominance are also studied
by Blanchard (2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2004). Consider the in°ationary shock that hit the
Brazilian economy in mid-2002 as an illustration of how ¯scal dominance reduces the e®ectiveness of
anti-in°ationary monetary policy. The shock, originated by the increasing likelihood of a left-wing
party taking power, provoked a sharp increase in the interest rate on dollar-denominated debt and
was followed by an equally sharp depreciation of the Brazilian currency. The typical response of
in°ation-targeting central banks to any in°ationary shock is to raise interest rates.3 However, the
Central Bank of Brazil did not increase the real interest rate until early 2003. Instead, Brazilian
authorities responded with ¯scal policy measures.4 According to Blanchard (2004), this was the
correct response, because under ¯scal dominance, the primary surplus is not constantly adjusted by
the ¯scal authority to keep debt out of an explosive path. Given the institutional ¯scal/monetary
setup, rational agents know that the monetary authority must respond by generating seigniorage
revenues now, or in the future; otherwise, the intertemporal budget constraint of the government
3Brazil is an o±cial in°ation-targeter since June 1999. See http://www.bcb.gov.br/?english.
4For instance, a commitment to a higher target for the primary surplus and reform of the pension system.6
will not hold. In this case, by increasing the expenditures required to service the debt, an interest
rate hike increases the probability of default on government debt. In turn, this makes debt a
less attractive option for investors, leading to further depreciation of the exchange rate and to
higher in°ation. Thus, under such a scenario, in°ation-targeting can have (unintended) perverse
consequences.
In both Blanchard (2004) and Favero and Giavazzi (2004), short run models of the Brazilian
economy are used to illustrate the theoretical impact of the ¯scal regime on the e®ectiveness of
monetary policy. They also take their models to the data to test for the existence of a \bad
equilibrium" consistent with the presence of ¯scal dominance ¡ that is, where monetary tightening
in response to an in°ationary shock has important ¯scal implications, a®ects the risk of default on
government liabilities, depreciates the exchange rate, and increases in°ation expectations. Both
studies ¯nd strong evidence of such a vicious circle.
In terms of the e®ects of ¯scal behaviour on prices and in°ation, our work is related to, but con-
ceptually di®erent from, the literature on the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). Under the
FTPL (Woodford 1995; Kocherlakota and Phelan 1999; Cochrane 1998, 2001), the price level is de-
termined by the intertemporal budget constraint as the quotient between the nominal value of debt
and the present value of total government revenues, under the assumption that the government's
actions are not constrained by budgetary issues. The intertemporal budget constraint holds as an
equilibrium condition, rather than as a constraint. Following a shock to the cost of debt service (an
interest rate hike, for example), if the sequence of primary surpluses is ¯xed, than the price level has
to rise to make the stock of nominal bonds inherited from the past consistent with the present value
of those surpluses and, as a consequence, to keep the government's intertemporal budget constraint
balanced. In°ation would take place regardless of how committed the monetary authority was to
price stability.5 In a FTPL framework, Uribe (2003) discusses potential inconsistencies between
¯scal policy and in°ation targeting. Both our model and the FTPL predict a relationship between
the price level and ¯scal variables. However, we assume that the intertemporal budget constraint is
always satis¯ed for any arbitrary sequence of prices, whereas the FTPL assumes it is an equilibrium
condition. This modeling di®erence means that our econometric results should not be interpreted
as a formal test of the FTPL.
The degree of interdependence between monetary and ¯scal policy may have its roots in in-
stitutional arrangements. To the extent that highly independent central banks may be less likely
to care about the government's ¯scal needs in order to set its policy, central bank independence
indices (Cuckierman 1992; Cuckierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993; and
Sturn and de Haan 2001) may be correlated with the degree of ¯scal dominance and thus provide
important insights regarding in°ation outcomes. This correlation may not be perfect, however,
5In this case, according to the FTPL, in°ation would take place even in a cashless economy. See Woodford (1995).3 The Model 7
because these indices may not capture some important informal or behavioral aspects of the ¯scal-
monetary authority relationship such as tradition, quality of research by the sta®, personalities of
key-individuals, etc.6
Finally, since we show the implications of ¯scal dominance for long-run average in°ation and
use a structural model with a well de¯ned welfare measure to evaluate the associated welfare costs
of ¯scal dominance, this paper is also related to the literature on the optimal rate of in°ation
(Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe 2004, 2005). In particular, our results suggest that optimal in°ation
rate may be positive, rather then zero or negative as implied by Firedman's Rule.
3 The Model
The economy consists of a representative household with an in¯nite planning horizon, a represen-
tative ¯rm that produces a single ¯nal good, a collection of monopolistically competitive ¯rms that
produce di®erentiated intermediate goods, and a government. The government consists of a ¯scal
authority that levies taxes, buys consumption goods, and issues debt, and a monetary authority
that supplies money to the economy. In the next three subsections, we describe the di®erent types
of agents in more detail.
3.1 Households
At each period t, the representative household sells labour services (hours-worked), ht, and rents
his capital stock inherited from the previous period, kt¡1, to intermediate goods ¯rms. Let wt
and rt be the real wage and rental rates of capital, respectively. As the owner of the ¯rms, the
household is entitled to nominal dividend payments, Dt. After-tax labour, capital, and dividend
income, plus the interest earned on government bonds carried over from period t ¡ 1, is used to
consume, invest in physical capital, and adjust the household's portfolio of ¯nancial assets, which
consists of interest-bearing government bonds and money balances.









































kt = (1 ¡ ±)kt¡1 + xt; (2)
6In session 4, we show how our measure of ¯scal dominance correlates with standard measures of institutional
central bank independence.8
where ct is consumption, ¿c
t is the consumption-tax rate, xt is real investment, Mt is nominal money
balances, pt is the aggregate price level, and Bt is the nominal holdings of government bonds at the
end of period t.7 The gross rate of in°ation is represented by ¼t = pt=pt¡1, and it¡1 is the gross
nominal interest rate on government bonds between t¡1 and t. Parameters ¯ 2 (0;1), Ã > 0, and
± 2 (0;1) are, respectively, the subjective discount factor, the interest-elasticity of money demand,
and the depreciation rate of capital.8 Capital accumulation follows the law of motion given by (2)
and is subject to a convex adjustment cost, CACt = (Ák=2)(xt=kt¡1 ¡ ±)
2 kt¡1, for Ák > 0.
The ¯rst-order conditions associated with the optimal choices of ct, mt ´ Mt=pt, ht, bt ´ Bt=pt,





















































where ¸t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period-t budget constraint.
3.2 Firms
3.2.1 Representative ¯nal good ¯rm
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers, indexed by j 2 [0;1], and a representative
competitive ¯rm that produces a single ¯nal good. The ¯nal good producer uses yt(j) units of
intermediate good of type j to produce yt units of output, according to the following constant-










7Real balances, mt=pt, are introduced as an argument in the utility function because they re°ect the convenience
of using money in carrying out transactions. See Walsh (2003).
8The term ¿t±kt on the right-hand side of (1) represents tax credits on the depreciated capital.3.2 Firms
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where µ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated intermediate goods.













Equation (10), a standard Stiglitz-Dixit demand function for intermediate good j, is decreasing









It is easy to verify that equations (9)¡(11) imply zero pro¯ts for the competitive ¯nal goods
¯rm. Also note that price dispersion across varieties creates a wedge between the aggregate output
among intermediate goods ¯rms and ¯nal good production as described in equation (10). This







dj ¸ 1, captures the loss in output induced by ine±cient





The explicit introduction of Lt is important for understanding the results of the welfare analysis
we undertake in section 3. As in Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2005), we express Lt recursively as:




3.2.2 Intermediate goods ¯rms
Intermediate goods ¯rms combine kt¡1(j) units of capital, ht(j) units of labor, and aggregate tech-
nology, at, to produce yt(j) units of di®erentiated good j, according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function given by:
yt(j) = atkt¡1(j)®ht(j)1¡®; (13)
where the level of technology (in logs) is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process characterized
by parameter ½a 2 (0;1), innovations "a;t » N(0;¾a), and the long-run stationary level, a = 1:
log(at) = ½a log(at¡1) + "a;t: (14)
Nominal rigidity is introduced through a Calvo-pricing framework. Whenever allowed to re-
optimize its price in period t, type¡ j ¯rm chooses kt¡1(j), ht(j), and pt(j) to maximize the10
discounted sum of expected future dividends, taking as given the real wage, wt, the rental rate, rt,
the aggregate price, pt, and the demand function (10).














subject to (10), (13) and
Dt(j) = pt(j)yt(j) ¡ [ptwtht(j) + rtkt¡1(j)]; (15)
pt+n(j) = pt(j), 8n ¸ 0; (16)
where Dt(j) represents nominal dividends in period t, ¸t is the marginal utility of consumption
given by the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period-t households' budget constraint (1),
(¯t¸t=¸0) is the stochastic discount factor used by shareholders to value pro¯ts at date t, and ¹t is
the probability that the price set at time 0 will still be in force at time t.
Let 't(j) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with a single constraint that combines (10),
(13), (15), and (16). The ¯rst-order conditions for the ¯rm's problem with respect to kt¡1(j) and
ht(j) are, respectively:








where 't(j) also denotes the real marginal cost at date t associated with ¯rm j's maximization
problem.
Equations (17) and (18) are the familiar conditions whereby the marginal products of labour
and capital, adjusted by the real marginal cost, equate their real prices. By combining these two
optimal conditions it is easy to show that the capital-to-labour ratio, kt¡1(j)=ht(j), is commom
across intermediate good producers. Since this symmetry also implies a common marginal cost
between ¯rms, in the rest of the paper we set 't(j) = 't, 8j.
























µ¡1 : (21)3.3 Government 11
Equation (19) determines the ¯rm's relative optimal price in a dynamic context, implying equal
marginal costs and marginal bene¯ts of changing prices.
It is convenient to express the in¯nite sums Xt and Zt recursively as:














In every period, the government consumes an exogenous amount of resources, gt. Government
expenditures, including interest payments on the outstanding debt, must be ¯nanced by: 1) dis-
tortionary taxes on consumption, ¿c
t , and on dividends, labour and capital income, ¿t, 2) issuing
money, MS
t , or 3) increasing public debt, BS
t .
The government's dynamic budget constraint (in units of the ¯nal good) is:




















where dt = Dt=pt is real dividends.
The ¯scal variables gt, ¿c
t , and ¿t follow stochastic processes given by:
log(gt=g) = ½g log(gt¡1=g) + "g;t; (25)
log(¿c
t =¿c) = ½¿c log(¿c
t¡1=¿c) + "¿c;t; (26)
log(¿t=¿) = ½¿ log(¿t¡1=¿) + "¿;t; (27)





v=1 (it+v¡1=¼t+v) be the n-periods-ahead real market discount factor and de¯ne
the primary surplus and seigniorage revenues at time t, respectively, as:
s¿
t = ¿c









Forward iteration on (24), combined with a no-Ponzi condition for the government, implies the12






















= Tt + St;
where Tt and St represent the (expected) present discounted values of primary surpluses and
seigniorage revenues, respectively.
The government is assumed to follow a \long-run" policy rule whereby it commits itself to
raise large enough primary surpluses (in present value terms) to back a constant fraction of the
outstanding debt. A more formal de¯nition is given below.
De¯nition (The ·-backing Fiscal Policy): Given a sequence of prices fit¡1;wt;rt;ptg
1
t=0 and
an initial stock of nominal debt BS













where · 2 [0;1].
Put simply, this policy rule means that a constant fraction, ·; of the outstanding government
debt, including interest payments, must be backed by the present discounted value of current
and future primary surpluses. Since the government's intertemporal budget constraint is always
satis¯ed, it follows that:





Hence, the policy rule (30) also implies that a fraction (1 ¡·) of the currently outstanding debt is
backed by the present discounted value of current and future seigniorage revenue. For convenience,


















The set of possible ¯scal regimes is indexed by the fraction · of the outstanding debt that is
backed by the primary surplus. Since · 2 [0;1], this set is a continuum limited by the following
two polar cases:
9The government's present value budget constraint holds with equality under the assumption that the government





t = 0:3.3 Government 13
(i) When · = 1, the ¯scal authority fully backs all outstanding debt. It commits itself to
adjust the stream of current and/or future primary surpluses in order to match the current value
of the government's bond obligations. Fiscal policy completely accomodates any open market sale
by the monetary authority. Whenever the monetary authority sells government bonds in the open
market, the ¯scal authority increases current or future taxes (and/or reduces current or future
expenditures) to back the principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt. On the
other hand, the monetary authority never responds to an increase in the stock of government debt
associated with a budget de¯cit. Sargent (1982) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) refer to this case
as a Ricardian regime. Because of the leading role played by the monetary authority, Leeper (1991)
refers to this case as one of active monetary/passive ¯scal policy. We interpret this case as one of
complete central bank independence or zero degree of ¯scal dominance.
(ii) In the case where · = 0, all outstanding debt is backed by the monetary authority, which
fully accommodates the ¯scal authority whenever a budget de¯cit is ¯nanced with debt. This ac-
commodation takes the form of an increase in current or future seigniorage revenues to back the
principal and interest payments on the newly issued debt. The ¯scal authority is insensitive to mon-
etary policy in the sense that neither taxes nor expenditure react (now or in the future) to changes
in the stock of outstanding government debt. Sargent (1982), and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) refer
to this case as a polar Non-Ricardian regime. Leeper (1991) calls it one of passive monetary/active
¯scal policy. We interpret this polar case as a situation of complete ¯scal dominance.
The long-run rule (30) is consistent with multiple period-by-period ¯scal policy rules. As an












Under (34), the nominal primary surplus is adjusted in every period (increasing ¿c
t or ¿t, or
reducing gt) in the exact amount needed to ¯nance a ¯xed fraction · of the interest on the out-
standing debt (BS
t¡1) net of an adjustment for debt growth. To see that this stationary policy
satis¯es (30), simply iterate forward on (34) and use the government's no-Ponzi game condition.
In principle, there might be other period-by-period policy rules (perhaps not time-stationary) that
are consistent with the rule (30). An advantage of our approach is that we are able to solve the
model and obtain empirical estimates of · using the long-run policy rule (30) without having to
assume that a particular policy such as (34) is satis¯ed in every period for every country in the
sample.
The parameter ·, characterizing the degree of interdependence between the ¯scal and mon-
etary authorities, should not be interpreted narrowly, as capturing a publicly announced policy
commitment, or a commitment formally written in a country's budget, constitution, or central
bank organic law. Instead, · re°ects the revealed preferences of the government about the backing14
of its debt, and arises from the interaction of the ¯scal and monetary authorities given a stable
institutional set-up. This interpretation is reinforced by the observation, discussed later, that the
price level is determined using the long-run ¯scal policy rule without any reference to particular
period-by-period ¯scal or monetary policy rules.
Our speci¯cation of government behavior follows an earlier literature that describes monetary
and/or ¯scal policies in terms of explicit rules. See, among others, Taylor (1993) and Clarida, Gal¶ ³,
and Gertler (2000) for monetary policy rules; and Sargent and Wallace (1981), Aiyagari and Gertler
(1985), Leeper (1991), and Bohn (1998) for ¯scal policy rules. Leeper and Bohn point out that
¯scal rules relating taxes to debt can be consistent with an optimizing government that minimizes
the cost of tax collection by smoothing marginal tax rates over time (Barro 1979). We view the
·-backing rule as a fairly unrestrictive way to parameterize government behavior that is convenient
both analytically and empirically. It captures in a reduced-form way the idea that in response
to di®erent institutional settings, the monetary authority will face di®erent obligations regarding
¯scal policy. Whether this rule is a su±ciently complete and realistic description of government
behavior beyond that just mentioned is an open question to be addressed in future research.
3.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium with two sets of ¯rms ¡ those allowed to choose prices
optimally, and those which use a non-optimal rule ¡ whose prices are identical. Without loss of
generality, assume that intermediate goods producers indexed by j 2 [0;¹) do not re-optimize
at time t, and keep their prices unchanged from time t ¡ 1, while the remaining ¯rms j 2 [¹;1)
optimally set their price according to equation (19). For the optimizing ¯rms, denote pt(j)=pt = p¤
t.






; 8j 2 [0;¹) (35)
= p¤
t;8j 2 (¹;1]:
A formal de¯nition of a symmetric equilibrium follows.
De¯nition (Symmetric Equilibrium): Given the stochastic processes for the structural shocks,
and initial stocks of money, M¡1, nominal debt, B¡1, and capital, k¡1, a symmetric equilibrium
corresponds to a price system fit¡1;wt;rt;pt;pt(j) 8jg
1
t=0, an allocation fct;xt;Mt;Bt;ht;ktg
1
t=0,







t=0, such that 8t ¸ 0: (i) kt¡1(j)=ht(j) = kt¡1=ht, (ii)
pt(j)=pt = p¤
t, 8j 2 [0;¹), and pt(j)=pt = pt¡1=pt, 8j 2 (¹;1], (iii) the representative consumer,
the representative ¯nal goods ¯rm, and the intermediate goods ¯rms optimize given the government
policy and the price system, (iv) the government policy is budget-feasible and satis¯es the ·¡backing3.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium 15











t > 0; (38)
Bt = BS
t ; (39)










The equilibrium de¯ned above implies that p¤





















Taking into account the output loss, Lt, and equilibrium conditions (36)¡(37), the aggregation
of intermediate goods ¯rms' production functions given by (13), and optimal demands for capital













As a ¯nal step in aggregation, note that zero pro¯ts for the competitive ¯nal goods ¯rm implies
ptyt =
R 1
0 pt(j)yt(j)dj. Combining that information with the dividends equation (15), integrating
for j;10 and imposing equilibrium conditions Dt(j) = Dt and (36)¡(37), an income-output equality
condition can be expressed in real terms as:
yt = wtht + rtkt¡1 + dt: (46)
10Which gives: Z 1
0







After imposing conditions (38)¡(39), the dynamic equilibrium (see Appendix) is completely
characterized by the following equations:
(i) law of motion for capital, (2);
(ii) household optimal conditions, (3)¡(7);
(iii) in¯nite sums Xt and Zt in recursive form, (22) and (23), respectively;
(iv) law of motion for the aggregate output loss, (12);
(v) government dynamic budget constraint, (24);
(vi) de¯nitions of current primary surplus and seigniorage revenues, (28) and (29), respectively;
(vii) ·-backing ¯scal policy rule, (31);
(viii) present discounted values of primary surpluses and seigniorage revenues in recursive form,
(32) and (33), respectively;
(ix) equilibrium condition for the ¯nal good, (40);
(x) optimal relative price, (41)¡(42);
(xi) aggregated production function, (43), and aggregate demands for capital and labour, (44)¡(45);
(xii) income-output national account identity, (46);
(xiii) stochastic processes (14) and (25)¡(27).
In a deterministic steady state, where all real variables, as well as in°ation and the nominal
interest rate are constant, we have:
¼ =
1







where b and m are the steady state levels of bt and mt, respectively. Notice that for a given
long-run average of debt-to-money ratio, b=m, provided that b > 0, a higher · (more independent
central bank) implies a lower level of steady-state in°ation. In the extreme case of zero ¯scal
dominance (i.e., · = 1) the government only relies on tax revenues (i.e., S = 0) and, in the absence
of indexation, prices are constant at the steady state (i.e., ¼ = 1). Figure 1 shows that ¯scal
dominance, as measured by (1 ¡ ·), has a positive relationship with ¼ for any given value of b=m.
It should be noted that for some combinations of parameters a unique equilibrium may not
exist. For instance, high degrees of ¯scal dominance (low values of ·) and/or price stickiness (high3.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium 17















¹) may lead to indeterminacy if the resulting parametrization makes it impossible to generate the
seigniorage revenues required by equation (31).
First, consider the case of · close to zero. As explained above, this implies high trend (average)
in°ation. For a given value of the discount factor ¯, high trend in°ation implies an equally high
steady-state nominal interest rate.11 According to the money demand function implied by the
household's optimal conditions (3), (4), and (6),12 holdings of real balances will be low on average.
If the demand for real balances is su±ciently low, it is possible that the level of seigniorage required
to balance the intertemporal budget constraint while satisfying the ·¡backing policy rule (31)
cannot be generated through moderate rates of in°ation. On the contrary, with the \tax-base"
(money holdings) of the \in°ation tax" shrinking to zero, the \tax-rate" (in°ation) would have to
11In the steady-state, i = ¼=¯.
12Combining the three conditions gives:
mt =


























grow unbounded to generate seigniorage.13
A high degree of price stickiness, for a given value of ·; may also lead to indeterminacy. As
¹ ! 1, in°ation can only be generated by a small share of ¯rms that optimally choose their prices
at any period t. Since there is no indexation in the non-optimal rule used by ¯rms that are not
allowed to set their prices optimally, the scope for raising seigniorage tends to zero as ¹ approaches
1. Depending on the value of ·, it may be impossible to generate the required seigniorage. Figure
2 shows the regions in the (·;¹)¡space for which there is a unique equilibrium.
To further develop the intuition about the e®ect of · on the equilibrium path of nominal
variables, consider a simpli¯ed version of the model such that:14 1) there is no uncertainty or
distortionary taxes on consumption, 2) there are no adjustment costs of capital and prices are fully
°exible (i.e., Ák = ¹ = 0), 3) the utility function is logarithimic on m = M=p (i.e., Ã = 1), and
4) there is no monopolistic competition (i.e., µ ¡! 1). Under these assumptions, it is possible
to express the price level as a function of a broad monetary aggregate that includes not only the
nominal stock of money, Mt, but also the proportion of debt that will be backed by current or
13Technically, by inducing non-stationarity in in°ation, a low enough value for · has the same e®ect on equilib-
rium determinacy as the well-know \Taylor-Principle" (Woodford 2003), re°ecting a coe±cient of Et¼t+1in the New
Keynesian Philips Curve that is higher than one.
14See Castro, de Resende and Ruge-Murcia (2003).4 Bayesian Estimation 19
future money creation, (1 ¡ ·)Bt:
pt =
(1 ¡ ¯)[Mt + (1 ¡ ·)Bt]
°ct
: (47)
According to (47), when there is no ¯scal dominance (· = 1), the stock of government debt will
not a®ect the price level. In this case, expression (47) has the standard \monetarist" interpretation
whereby the price level is proportional to the ratio of money over a measure of real expenditures.
On the other hand, as · ¡! 0, the e®ect of Bt on the price level increases linearly with the degree
of ¯scal dominance.
4 Bayesian Estimation
In this section, we estimate a linearized version of the model around its deterministic steady-state
equilibrium for the following economies (sample in parenthesis): Canada (1957Q1¡2005Q1), Mex-
ico (1982Q1¡2005Q4), South Korea (1970Q2¡2000Q3), and the United States (1957Q1¡2006Q1).
We follow Chang, Gomes, and Schorfheide (2002) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) in incorpo-
rating prior information about some structural parameters into a Maximum-Likelihood estimation
method. Since Bayesian techniques have now become widely used in the estimation of DSGE mod-
els, we only provide a brief description of the methodology. For a more detailed discussion, see An
and Schorfheide (2007).
The empirical analysis is based on quarterly, real (de°ated by the Consumer Price Index, CPI)
per-capita data on total government debt, output, and private consumption, as well as quarterly
in°ation data. All series come from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database compiled
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the exception of government debt for Canada and
the United States, which come from national sources.15 For Mexico and South Korea, government
debt corresponds to the IFS series 88 (Total Debt), and the sum of IFS series 88a (Domestic
Debt) with IFS series 89a (Foreign Debt), respectively. Output, measured by the Gross Domestic
Product, corresponds to the IFS series 99b..ZF. Private consumption corresponds to the series 96F
(Household Consumption Expenditures or Private Consumption), and in°ation is computed as the
growth rate of the CPI. Population is measured by IFS series 99Z..ZF (mid-year estimate of the
total population by the United Nation's Monthly Bulletin of Statistics). Prior to their use in the
estimation, all series are adjusted for seasonality and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
¯lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
The estimation procedure consists of four broad steps. First, a state-space representation of the
linearized model is obtained using Blanchard and Khan's (1980) procedure. The state-space solution
15For the United States, government debt is the Gross Federal Debt Held by the Public from the U.S. Department
of Commerce, available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (www.stls.frb.org). For Canada, it corresponds
to the series D469409 (Net Federal Government Debt) in the CANSIM database of Statistics Canada.20
consists of one transition equation for the (vector of) endogenous state variables and exogenous
shocks (i.e., the \state equation"), and one (vector) equation mapping the state variables into the
observable variables that will be used later in the estimation of the model (i.e., the \measurement
equation").
Estimated DSGE models such as ours display a well-known \singularity problem." When there
are fewer exogenous shocks than endogenous variables, there will exist (deterministic) linear com-
binations of these variables holding exactly in the model while not in the data. This form of
misspeci¯cation leads to a rank-de¯cient (singular) variance-covariance matrix for the dynamic
system and, regardless of the sample size, becomes an obstacle to likelihood estimation (See Ruge-
Murcia 2007). In the presence of unobserved (e.g, Xt, Zt, Tt, St, and Lt) or poorly measured state
variables (e.g, the capital stock, kt), one standard way of dealing with this problem is to use the
same number (four, in our case) of observable variables as structural shocks ("a;t, "g;t, "¿c;t, and
"¿;t) and exploit the recursive structure of the model and its laws of motion to construct inferences
about the unobserved state variables using the Kalman ¯lter (see Hamilton 1994, chapter 13). This
allows the evaluation of the joint (log) likelihood function of observable endogenous variables, which
can then be maximized.
Let b z represent the deviation of variable z from its steady-state level. Given the vectors of state
(including unobserved) variables, St, and observable variables, Ft, the state-space representation of
the model's linearized solution is:


















and A12£12, B12£4, and C4£12 are matrices of structural parameters.16
As a second step, prior to estimation we calibrate seven structural parameters to mitigate
potential identi¯cation problems. Such problems are di±cult to detect in estimated DSGE models
due to the non-linear mapping from the vector of structural parameters into the above state-space
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representation that determines the joint probability distribution of Ft (An and Schorfheide 2007).
The vector of calibrated parameters is:
£0
1 = [®;±;µ;g;¿c;¿;´;°];
and for all country-speci¯c estimations of the model, we set:
(i) the capital share at ® = 0:36 and the depreciation rate at ± = 0:025, as in Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005);
(ii) the parameter that governs the elasticity of substitution between di®erent brands of inter-
mediate goods at µ = 8, which implies a steady-state markup of 14 per cent and lies in the 10 ¡20
per cent interval found in the empirical literature (e.g., Basu 1995);
(iii) the steady-state level of government spending, g, to match the average share of government
consumption in GDP;
(iv) the steady-state consumption-tax rate, ¿c, to match the ratio between consumption at
market prices and GDP at factor-cost prices;17
(v) the parameters that determine: 1) the elasticity of labour supply, ´, 2) the scaling preference
parameter of money demand, °, and 3) the steady-state income-tax rate, ¿, to match the steady-
state level of hours-worked at h = 0:3, and the money-to-GDP and debt-to-money ratios at their
sample averages, respectively.
Table 1 summarizes the calibration procedure.
Table1: Calibration
Parameter De¯nition United States Canada Korea Mexico Motivation
® Capital share 0:36 0:36 0:36 0:36 CEE (2005)
± Depreciation rate 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025 CEE (2005)
µ Elast. of Substitution 8 8 8 8 Basu (1995)
g SS gov't consumption 0:13 0:17 0:14 0:10 g=y
¿c SS consumption-tax rate 0:13 0:13 0:18 0:11 (1 + ¿c)c=y
¿ SS income-tax rate 0:11 0:14 0:01 0:03 b=y




8:95 5:91 4:81 9:10 m=y
SS Ratio
g=y Gov't consumption/GDP 0:18 0:19 0:12 0:09
m=y Money/GDP 0:07 0:06 0:09 0:09
b=y Debt/GDP 0:40 0:54 0:13 0:32
17That is, we considered all indirect taxes net of subsidies as consumption taxes.22
Third, we specify prior distributions over the 13 remaining parameters to be estimated. Using
priors to weigh the likelihood function has two potential advantages: 1) it may down-weight regions
of the parameter space that are at odds with the researcher's beliefs based on information (economic
theory, previous studies, etc.) not contained in the estimation sample and 2) it might add curvature
to a likelihood function that would be otherwise (nearly) °at in some dimensions of the parameter
space, making it easier to identify a maximum using numerical methods. Maximization of the
weighted likelihood function provides the mode of the posterior distribution and yields consistent
and asymptotically normal estimates of the following vector of structural parameters:
£0
2 = [½a;½g;½¿c;½¿;¾a;¾g;¾¿c;¾¿;Ã;¯;Ák;¹;·]:
Colums 3 ¡ 5 of Table 2 summarize the prior distributions used in the Bayesian estimation.
Since the shape of the posterior distribution is highly a®ected by the choice of priors, we use the
same prior distributions for all countries to control for country-speci¯c features of the posterior
that may be generated by the prior rather than by the likelihood. Following Smets and Wouters
(2003), Beta and Gamma distributions are used for parameters in the (0;1) interval and for those
assumed to be strictly positive, respectively. Inverse Gamma is used for the standard deviations of
structural shocks.
Except for ·, prior mean values for parameters in £2 are assigned according to previous es-
timations of DSGE models for Canada, as in Dib (2003, 2008), Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004),
and Ortega and Rebei (2006), and for the Euro Area and the United States, as in Smets and
Wouters (2003) and Chistiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), respectively. According to these
studies, point estimates of the auto-regressive coe±cients in the stochastic processes of technology
and government spending shocks fall in the [0:6;0:98] and [0:76;0:96] intervals, respectively. As for
the standard deviations, estimates lie between 0:004 and 0:06. Accordingly, we set the prior mean
values for ½a, ½g, ½¿c, and ½¿ at 0:8, and use 0:01 for ¾a and ¾g, and 0:02 for ¾¿c and ¾¿. For the
preference parameter Ã, which governs the interest rate elasticity of money demand, we set the
prior mean at 0:25. Given the calibrated value of °, this value lies within the range of implied values
used in Dib (2003), Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004), and also Ortega and Rebei (2006). For the
discount factor, ¯, we use the standard value of 0:99, implying an annual real interest rate of 4 per
cent. Following estimates by Ortega and Rebei (2006), the prior mean for the capital adjustment
cost parameter, Ák, is set at 10. In addition, for the Calvo-pricing parameter, ¹, we use the same
prior mean value of 0:75 as in Smets and Wouters (2003), which implies that ¯rms change prices
once every four quarters.18 Finally, to avoid the regions on the parameter space where there may
18Considering the studies mentioned above, point estimates lie in the [0:5;0:9] interval, including some sector-
speci¯c estimates (i.e., tradables, nontradable goods). In general, values in the lower-end of that interval arise in
models also featuring nominal wage rigidity (i.e, Chistiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005, Ortega and Rebei 2006,4 Bayesian Estimation 23
be indeterminacy due to a high degree of ¯scal dominance, we use the Beta distribution as a prior
for the parameter ·, with mean at 0:9.
As a forth and ¯nal step, we proceed to likelihood estimation and use the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm to numerically compute the moments of the posterior distribution of the model's esti-
mated parameters. Estimation results are displayed in Colums 6¡9 of Table 2. Estimation results
suggest that:
(i) Compared with Mexico and South Korea, technology shocks are more persistent and less
volatile in Canada and in the United States, which is consistent with stylized facts about business
cycle volatility in emerging economies reported by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Resende (2006).
The opposite is true for shocks to the income tax rate: higher volatility and less persistency in
Canada/U.S. relative to Mexico/Korea.
(ii) In all four countries, shocks to both government spending and the consumption tax rate
display high persistence, in line with previous estimates in the literature.
(iii) In contrast with the income tax rate, shocks to the consumption tax rate are more volatile
in Mexico and South Korea vis-a-vis Canada and the United States.
(iv) The estimated interest rate elasticity of money demand is close to 0:3 in all countries, in line
with estimates by Ambler, Dib, and Rebei (2004) for Canada, but higher than the value (= 0:09)
implied by estimations in Chistiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
(v) Korean and Mexican households seem to discount the future more heavily than households
in the United States and Canada. Although this ¯nding is consistent with the higher ex-post real
interest rates observed in South Korea and Mexico, the low estimated values of ¯, even for the case
of the U.S. and Canada, imply unrealistically high values for the real interest rate. However, in
stylized models of representative consumers, low discount factors may account for the presence of
¯nancially constrained households (not considered here).19
(vi) The degree of price rigidity is higher and ¯scal dominance is lower in the United States
and Canada, than in South Korea and Mexico. Both ¯ndings may be related to the higher average
in°ation rates observed in the latter two countries. The estimated values of ¹ imply frequencies
of price adjustment of roughly once every two quarters for the U.S. and Korea, once every three
quarters for Canada, and once every four and a half months for Mexico. These ¯gures are in line
with ¯ndings by Bils and Klenow (2004) and Gagnon (2007), who report the median time between
price changes as 5.5 months in the U.S. and 1.5 quarters in Mexico, respectively.
and Dib 2008), while higher values are found when there is no indexation or habit formation in consumption (i.e.,
Smets and Wouters 2003).
19For instance, in the case of Mexico, the estimated value of ¯ implies an annual real interest rate of about 20%.
Although it seems unrealistic at ¯rst glance, this ¯nding is consistent with estimates by Attanasio, Meghir, and
Santiago (2005) who explain their results by the existence of ¯nancially constrained Mexican households. A higher





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24 Bayesian Estimation 25
Our empirical results regarding the degree of ¯scal dominace may shed some light on the ¯ndings
of Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002), who used annual panel data from 133 market economies and
reported that the expected negative relationship between the ¯scal balance and in°ation is not
veri¯ed for low-in°ation, mostly developed, countries. A possible explanation for their ¯nding is
that in a regime of monetary dominance, government debt plays no role in the determination of the
price level. This point is related to Sargent's (1982) observation that \one cannot necessarily prove
that current de¯cits are not in°ationary by running time-series regressions and ¯nding a negligible
e®ect." The question of whether budget de¯cits are in°ationary is intimately related to a country's
policy regime and institutional arrangements.
In addition, to the extent that a high degree of ¯scal dominance may impose di±culties to in°a-
tion targeting regimes as suggested by Loyo (1999), Sims (2005), and Kumhof, Nunes, and Yakadina
(2007), low estimated values of · may have important policy implications for in°ation targeters
such as Mexico and South Korea. Reforms that improve ¯scal fundamentals may be needed in
order for the monetary authority to set its policy instrument without much consideration of the
¯scal situation, as required by in°ation targeting. For instance, if the institutional arrangements
that allow higher degrees of ¯scal dominance are characterized by the combination of a weak ¯scal
revenue base, an underdeveloped tax system, and government overspending, reforms that eliminate
¯scal dominance not only increase the ability of in°ation targeting central banks to ¯ght in°ation
aggressively but also produce welfare gains (Kumhof, Nunes, and Yakadina 2007).20
Given our interpretation of · as summarizing the interaction between the ¯scal and monetary
authorities in a given institutional setup, a comparison of the degree of ¯scal dominance implied
by the estimated · with standard institutional measures of central bank independence (CBI) may
be helpful. Since the estimates of · may capture not only the legal aspects of the central bank's
relatioship with the ¯scal authority, but also informal behavioral elements of policy decision-making
in practice, we consider two indices proposed by Cuckierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). First,
we use a legal CBI index, constructed on the basis of scores attached to di®erent legal aspects of a
central bank's operation.21 Second, we look at a CBI index based on the turnover rate of central
bank governors, which can be a proxy (when higher than a certain threshold) for actual central
bank independence. According to this measure, a high turnover rate may indicate low CBI.22 Table
3 shows that our estimates of · correlate well ¡ in the sense that higher values of · are associated
with higher levels of CBI ¡ with both the legal CBI index and the (reciprocal of) the turnover rate
of central bank governors.
20In fact, a package of ¯scal reform designed to strengthen Mexico's public ¯nances was sent to Congress in June
2007 (see The Economist, June 2007). For a discussion of reforms in Korea's tax system, see Kim (2005).
21These may include such features as the terms of o±ce of the central bank director(s), restrictions on public sector
borrowing from the central bank, con°ict resolution between the central bank and the executive branch, etc.
22Rather than autonomy, low turnover rates may re°ect subordination of governors who want to keep their jobs.26
Table 3: · and Central Bank Independence
CWN(1992) CBI Index
Country · legal 1
Turnover
Canada 0.986 0.45 10.0
United States 0.966 0.48 7.7
South Korea 0.782 0.27 2.3
Mexico 0.629 0.34 6.7
Correlation with · : 0.76 0.53
4.1 Impulse Response Functions
To asses the dynamic properties of the model, we look at the linearized version of the dynamic sys-
tem around the deterministic steady-state. The results presented here are based on the parametriza-
tion obtained for the United States, except for the value of ·, which will be changed to study the
sensitivity of the dynamic responses of key variables to shocks under di®erent scenarios of ¯scal
dominance. The dynamic system, summarized in the Appendix, is standard except for the equa-
tion related to the ·¡backing policy rule. At ¯rst glance, · only a®ects the system's dynamics
through equation (31). Note that (1 ¡ ·) enters the equation in a multiplicative way, which may
suggest that · does not appear in the linearized version of the system. However, since · a®ects
the stationary equilibrium, especially the steady-state (trend) in°ation, as shown in the previous
subsection, it will a®ect the coe±cients of the linearized equations. For di®erent values of ·, Figure
3 displays the dynamic responses of money growth, output, consumption, investment, the primary
surplus, and in°ation to a one percent change in each of the four shocks.
It is standard to consider the response of the economy to \monetary shocks." However, in the
model discussed above, there is no monetary shock per se, since both money growth and the interest
rate are fully endogenous. Except for the case in which · = 1, the overall e®ects of exogenous
shocks can be interpreted as a combination of the direct e®ect of the original (exogenous) shock
with an indirect e®ect due to the endogenous response of money growth. When · = 1, the ¯scal
authority backs all debt, the monetary authority does not respond, and money growth is completely
insensitive to shocks, which will have the standard e®ects on the economy. For instance, in Figure
3, when · = 1, the impulse response functions (IRF) in the ¯rst row show that money growth
does not react to any of the four shocks. Consider a positive technology shock, for example. The
negative e®ect on in°ation, as well as the positive responses of output, consumption, investment,
and the primary surplus are fully explained by the direct e®ect of the shock, since money growth
does not respond.
When · < 1, however, money growth responds to shocks and the economy's response, including4.1 Impulse Response Functions 27














































































































































the direction of change of key variables, will be highly dependent on the particular value of ·. Again,
consider the case of a technology shock that increases output and consumption while reducing
in°ation. Higher taxes resulting from higher yt and ct should increase the primary surplus, s¿
t,
and, if real balances are high enough, the drop in in°ation should reduce seigniorage revenues, sM
t .
However, in this model, s¿
t and sM
t must move in the same direction to keep the proportion of debt
backed by each type of government revenue ¡ taxes or seigniorage ¡ in line with that required by
the policy rule.23 Thus, the increase in s¿
t must be followed by an increase in sM
t . As shown in
Figure 3, we observe two very di®erent IRFs for high (· = 0:9) and low (· = 0:5) values of ·.
23The changes must be proportional to ·. However, in the linearized version of the model, · disappears from the





When · is high, the increase in sM
t requires a faster rate of money growth, which will have
the standard e®ect of a positive monetary shock (higher yt;ct; xt and s¿
t;as well as higher ¼t). On
one hand, the direct e®ect of the technology shock (increase) on yt;ct; xt, and s¿
t is reinforced by
the endogenous indirect e®ect of a higher rate of money growth, making those variables increase
by even more than they would if · = 1. On the other hand, regarding ¼t, the two e®ects go
in opposite directions, with the (positive, endogenous) e®ect of money growth dominating the
(negative, exogenous) e®ect of the technology shock. The net result is that ¼t increases.
The IRFs are much di®erent when · is low. As discussed above, high ¯scal dominance means
high average in°ation, and low holdings of real balances. If · is low enough, the required increase in
seigniorage cannot be generated through an increase in money growth and more in°ation. On the
contrary, higher rates of money growth will further reduce real balances and completely o®set the
increase in in°ation, causing seigniorage to decrease. In other words, a low · may put the economy
on the \wrong side" of the seigniorage \La®er Curve," meaning that an increase in revenues can
only be obtained through a reduction in the tax rate (i.e., in°ation) that induces an increase in the
tax-base (i.e., real balances). Notice that when · = 0:5, the required reduction in money growth to
generate the increase in seigniorage produces an overall negative response of output, consumption,
and investment that more than o®sets the initial positive e®ects of the technology shock. It also
reinforces the negative e®ect on in°ation.
To the extent that di®erent values of ·, given the remaining structural parameters, imply
distinct levels of trend in°ation and signi¯cantly a®ect the equilibrium dynamics, the assumption
of non-zero trend in°ation becomes crucial for identi¯cation purposes in the estimation exercise
discussed above.
The role of price stickiness is illustrated in Figure 4. As ¹ increases, real marginal costs must
change at a greater rate compared with the case of °exible prices to have the same impact on
in°ation. That is, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve becomes °atter with increasing ¹. For a
given value of ·, less pass-through of marginal costs to in°ation requires a stronger response of
money growth to shocks in order to produce the same increase in in°ation. In the special case
where ¹ = 0, prices are completely °exible, money becomes neutral even in the short-term, and ·
has no dynamic e®ect at all. The presence of price stickiness in the model is also crucial for the
identi¯cation of · in the estimation exercise we perform in section 4.
Finally, we discuss the e®ects of the interest-elasticity of money demand, Ã, on the equilibrium.
Since the initial response of seigniorage to shocks depends on how real money balances endogenously
react to changes in in°ation, the indirect e®ect of shocks, as described above, should be stronger
for higher values of Ã. Indeed, Figure 5 shows that, for given values of · and ¹, a higher value of
Ã induces money growth to respond more to shocks.
The impulse response functions discussed in this section are obtained from a linear approxi-4.1 Impulse Response Functions 29









































































































































mation to the model's equilibrium given the estimated or calibrated parameters from the previous
section. In the next section, we consider the same parametrization in a second-order approximation
of the model, which will be used in a welfare analysis of ¯scal dominace.30











































































































































In this section we consider the welfare implications of ¯scal dominance by analyzing a second-order
approximation of the solution around the stationary equilibrium.24 Given the tension between the
two alternative ways of backing the outstanding level of government debt in the model (primary
surpluses or seigniorage revenues), welfare losses associated with di®erent ·¡backing policy regimes
will depend on distortions caused by each option. On one hand, taxation is distortionary on the
consumption-labor choice of households. On the other hand, in the presence of sticky prices,
24Kim and Kim (2003) show that second-order approximations help avoid spurious welfare ordering reversals that
may occur in models solved using ¯rst-order approximations.5 Welfare analysis 31
average in°ation increases the marginal cost¡price disconnect as previously discussed, produces
higher price dispersion among intermediate goods producers, and induces suboptimal output, with
negative welfare e®ects. According to the model, as · increases from 0 to 1, more emphasis is
put on distortionary taxation vis-µ a-vis distortions associated with in°ationary ¯nancing of the
government's budget.
Figure 6 shows, for di®erent values of ¹, the steady-state levels of the household's utility, output
loss (Lt), consumption, and hours-worked as · goes from 0 to 1. Notice that the welfare gain of
reducing the degree of ¯scal dominance is highly dependent on the existence of price stickiness. For
instance, when ¹ = 0:7, a higher value of · implies higher steady-state utility as the backing of
government debt relies less on in°ationary ¯nancing. In this case, the reduction in the distortion
caused by in°ation, in terms of output loss, dominates the increase in the distortion caused by
more taxation.
Figure 6: E®ect of the Degree of Fiscal Dominance on the Welfare Steady-state







































































Interestingly, complete central bank independence is not necessarily optimal. Note that for very
high (close to 1) values of ·, the welfare gains associated with even lower average in°ation may be32
too small to o®set the increase in distortions due to taxation. For instance, when ¹ = 0 and prices
are °exible there are almost no distortions associated with average in°ation25 since there are no
output losses. In this case, replacing in°ationary ¯nancing with increased taxation will negatively
a®ect consumption and utility, without the bene¯t of a reduction in in°ation-induced distortions.
To the extent that · helps determine average or steady-state in°ation, results from the welfare
analysis have implications for the optimal rate of in°ation. For instance, since · = 1 is not always
optimal, the Friedman Rule (Friedman 1969) ¡ whereby optimality requires a de°ation rate equal
to the real interest rate ¡ does not apply. On the contrary, the model implies a positive optimal
rate of in°ation in line with Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2005).
Table 4: Fiscal Dominance and Business Fluctuations
Benchmark (· = 1) (· = 0:90) (· = 0:50)
std(yt) 0:0123 0:0281 0:0391
std(ct) 0:0112 0:0226 0:0282
std(xt) 0:0277 0:0751 0:0960
std(bt) 0:0754 0:1288 0:0393
std(¼t) 0:0029 0:0236 0:0168
The solution based on second-order approximation around the steady-state also allows a more
precise study of the second-order e®ects of shocks on business °uctuations. Table 4 shows that
output, consumption, and investment become (monotonically) more volatile with reductions in ·.
This is explained by the fact that, as · is reduced, the ¯scal authority is responsible for a smaller
share of the adjustment to di®erent shocks, while in°ationary ¯nancing becomes more important.
In this case, the indirect e®ect of shocks ¡ that follow from the induced changes in money growth
¡ tend to overcompensate the direct (original) e®ects, in line with the discussion of the impulse-
response functions in the previous section.
Table 5: Fiscal Dominance and the Variance Decomposition (In¯nite Horizon)
Benchmark (· = 1) (· = 0:90) (· = 0:50)
"z;t "g;t "¿c;t "¿;t "z;t "g;t "¿c;t "¿;t "z;t "g;t "¿c;t "¿;t
Yt 93:97 1:60 1:05 3:39 55:69 16:95 11:14 16:22 3:47 35:53 24:19 36:81
Ct 88:58 1:87 6:57 2:98 58:88 22:73 5:65 12:73 2:47 26:86 31:90 38:76
Xt 94:23 1:24 0:82 3:71 45:35 23:19 15:24 16:22 4:89 32:25 21:96 40:89
bt 61:65 17:59 11:55 9:21 46:51 23:30 15:32 14:88 55:33 17:17 11:69 15:80
¼t 93:12 1:66 1:09 4:12 16:03 30:89 20:31 32:78 22:51 29:36 20:00 28:13
25Except for a very small distortion due to utility losses associated with lower equilibrium holdings of real balances.5 Welfare analysis 33
Table 5 shows the variance decomposition for the e®ects of shocks on the overall variance of the
system. Note that the share of technology shocks in the total variance is reduced for lower values of
·, while ¯scal-type shocks (government consumption, income-tax, and consumption-tax) become
more important.
Given the estimates of ¯ and ·, as well as the average debt-to-money ratios observed in the four
countries in the sample, we use the second-order approximation solution to compute: 1) the average
in°ation implied by the model (to be compared with the data) and 2) the equivalent-consumption
welfare gains of completely eliminating ¯scal dominance. The results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Welfare Costs
average estimates average annual ¼ welfare gain
Country b=m · ¯ model data as · ! 1
Canada 8:5 0:986 0:982 0:9 % 4:0 % 0:11 %
Korea 1:5 0:782 0:955 6:2 % 8:9 % 1:02 %
Mexico 3:4 0:629 0:964 21:1 % 20:8 % 9:43 %
United States 6:1 0:966 0:986 1:2 % 4:1 % ¡0:01 %
Note that the model cannot accurately match the average in°ation for the United States and
Canada, but is able to capture the high average in°ation levels observed in Mexico and South
Korea. Also, in contrast to Mexico and South Korea, Canada and the United States exhibit low
enough degrees of ¯scal dominance that further increases in central bank independence will not yield
substantive welfare gains. In the United States, for instance, the reduction in in°ationary distortions
associated with less ¯scal dominance would not compensate for the additional tax distortions. This
illustrates the possibility that zero ¯scal dominance, or complete central bank independence, may
not necessarily be optimal, as discussed above.
To summarize, the results from the welfare analysis have two main implications. First, there are
signi¯cant welfare gains from reducing the degree of ¯scal dominance in high-in°ation countries. In
the presence of nominal rigidities, the lower average in°ation associated with less ¯scal dominance
reduces the output loss coming from price dispersion in a monopolistically competitive environment.
To the extent that · captures institutional aspects of the interaction between the monetary and ¯scal
authorities, the results con¯rm the idea that institutional arrangements based on more independent
central banks together with ¯scal policies that actively respond to government liabilities tend to be
welfare improving.
Second, the trade-o® between using distortionary taxation or in°ationary revenues to ¯nance
the government's budget is not always resolved in favour of a negative or zero optimal rate of34
in°ation. Zero ¯scal dominance, as de¯ned by the parameter (1 ¡ ·) is not necessarily optimal,
since some in°ationary taxation may be needed to reduce distortions coming from regular taxation.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses a DSGE model, applied to an in¯nite-horizon monetary economy with sticky prices
and non-zero trend in°ation, to study how ¯scal and monetary policy interact to determine the
competitive equilibrium. The government's behavior is summarized by a long-run ¯scal policy rule,
where a fraction of the outstanding debt is backed by the present discounted value of current and
future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by the present discounted value of current
and future seigniorage revenue. Economies may thus be indexed by the fraction of debt backed by
the ¯scal authority, which indicates the degree of ¯scal dominance.
We show that the parameter · that indexes the policy regimes is very important to the short-
run dynamics. In particular, impulse-response functions for key variables following both technology
and standard ¯scal shocks are substantially di®erent, not only in terms of magnitude but especially
in terms of direction of change, for low and high values of ·.
Bayesian econometric techniques are used to identify and estimate · in four economies. Results
for the United States and Canada suggest that in these countries (i) the ¯scal authority backs
almost all outstanding debt, (ii) debt should play only a minor role in the determination of the
price level, and (iii) a low degree of ¯scal dominance/high degree of central bank independence is a
reasonable approximation for the ¯scal and monetary regimes. These results do not hold for South
Korea and Mexico, which exhibit higher degrees of ¯scal dominance. In addition, the estimated
degrees of ¯scal dominance correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.
Welfare analysis shows that complete central bank independence (or zero ¯scal dominance) may
not be optimal, because the reduction in in°ationary distortions may be o®set by the increase in
tax distortions as the policy regime shifts from ¯scal dominance (where in°ationary ¯nancing of the
government budget is relatively more important than tax revenues) to central bank independence.
In addition, lowering the degree of ¯scal dominance, from the level consistent with estimated
parameters to zero, would bring important welfare gains for South Korea and Mexico, but not for
Canada nor for the United States.REFERENCES 35
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Appendix: The Dynamic System
(1) ¸t ¡ 1
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(6) Ltyt ¡ atk®
t¡1h1¡®
t = 0
(7) wt ¡ ®'t
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ht = 0
(8) rt ¡ (1 ¡ ®)'t
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kt¡1 = 0
(9) kt ¡ [(1 ¡ ±)kt¡1 + xt] = 0
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(12) yt ¡ (wtht + rtkt¡1 + dt) = 0
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(23) log(at) ¡ [½a log(at¡1) + "a;t] = 0








(26) log(¿t=¿) ¡ [½¿ log(¿t¡1=¿) + "¿;t] = 0